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ROLE OF NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS IN IMPLEMENTING NONREGULATORY CODES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN SMES
LISTED IN THE ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT MARKET IN THE UK:
A CONTENT ANALYSIS
Anil Chandrakumara*, Gunetilleke Walter**
Abstract
This study explores roles of NEDs of SMEs listed in the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) in the
London Stock Exchange. It extends the literature on NEDs' roles relevant to a context where the
adherence to the principles of non-regularity corporate governance is not compulsory. We adopted a
content analysis approach as a novel method for exploring roles of NEDs using details of 1220 NEDs
recorded in 75 annual reports. It revealed that NEDs meet the expectations of several stakeholders
simultaneously by playing multiple roles. A conceptual model depicting testable relationship between
cognitive tasks and key roles of NEDs is also developed.
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Introduction

associated with roles ofNEDs directors (Maseda et al.,
2014) and codes on corporate governance.
With regard to empirical research on the roles of
NEDs in SMEs, a number of related issues have also
been reported. First, research on roles of NEDs in
SMEs has not received adequate and continuous
attention (e.g. Seiascia et al., 2013; Voordeckers et a!.,
2007) and they have largely been taken only when there
are corporate collapses (Jones and Pollit, 2003; Sevic,
2005). Second, the topic of corporate governance role in
SMEs is relatively recent (Gnan et al., 2013; Al-Najjar,
2014) and largely under researched, and remains poorly
theorized (Seiascia et a!., 20 13; Pye and Pettigrew;
2005, Collier, 2004). Third, the role of NEDs in SMEs
has not been examined in the context where the
implementation of NRCCGA is not compulsory. As
such, this paper aims at filling the knowledge gap in
understanding the role of NEDs of SMEs listed in the
Alternative Investment Market (AIM) in the London
Stock Exchange with specific reference to voluntary
codes on corporate governance. Specifically, this study
examines (a) what are the roles played by NEDs of
SMEs in AIM listed companies in the UK? (b) What
characteristics ofNEDs' roles of these companies could
be identified through content analysis? and, (c) Is there
any relationship between different roles played by
NEDs of AIM companies?

The separation of ownership and management in listed
companies demands the appointment of the NonExecutive Directors (NEDs) into the board of directors
to align the interests of the managers and the
shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983a). However,
corporate governance problems such as expropriation of
assets of the shareholders by managers (Shleifer and
Vishny, 1997), excessive salary increases for CEOs and
other executives (Bebchuk and Fried, 2005),
expenditure on decoration of office complexes and
luxury facilities (Berle and Means, 1933) etc. are some
of the sources of conflicts of interests between the
shareholders and the managers. Although these
conflicts have been documented as relevant to large
scale and public limited liability firms, they might be
generally applicable for any small or medium firms
(SMEs) listed in the Alternative Investment Market
(AIM) (e.g. Chris and Kean, 2010; Gunatilake and
Chandrakumara, 2012). The negligence of duties
towards a number of other stakeholders such as debtors
and suppliers has also been noted by a number of other
researchers (e.g. Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Donaldson
and Preston, 1995; Helland and Sykuta, 2005; Belden,
Fister and Knapp, 2005). Essentially, these issues are

"

J.. NTA'R Pf<LS.~~
'2!ill!if - - - -

220

Corporate Ownersftip ~Contra{/ o/o{ume 13, Issue 1, )!utumn 2015, Continuecf- 2

goals and objectives and monitor the reporting of
performance. They should satisfY themselves on
the integrity of financial information and that
financial controls and systems of risk
management are robust and defensible. They are
responsible for determining appropriate levels of
remuneration of executive directors and have a
prime role in appointing and, where necessary,
removing executive directors, and in succession
planning' (FRC, 2012, p.10).

The AIM has grown in many aspects since its
launch in 1995 to date, which includes an increase in
number of the UK and international companies to 861
and 226 respectively and in equity capital from a mere
£82 million to £80,592 million(AIM, 2014). However,
there is a dearth of research on the AIM listed
companies. For example, we have found only two
papers which discuss some aspects of the corporate life
of these companies and with the use the phrase
'Alternative Investment Market' within the title of their
papers (Mallin and Ow-Yong, 1998; Parsa and Kouchy,
2008; Alessandra, 2010). Further, NEDs in SMEs play
such critical roles as advising, formulating strategies,
supervising day to day operations, paying marketing
visits to foreign firms etc. (e.g. Deakins, O'Neill and
Milliken, 2000; Corbetta and Salvato, 2004; Long,
Dulewicz and Gay, 2005; Minichilli and Hansen, 2007).
However, the role of NEDs with regard to voluntary
application of the UK's Code on Corporate Governance
by the AIM listed firms has not been paid much
attention. This may be due to the fact that those SMEs
that are new to listing might consider that some of the
provisions are disproportionate or less relevant in their
cases or some of the provisions do not apply for
companies below the FTSE 350 (Financial Times Stock
Exchange -350). Given these realities, such SMEs may
consider that it might be appropriate for them to adopt
the approach outlined in the Code as they are
encouraged to do so (FRC, 2012). As such, this study is
aimed at contributing to the knowledge in
understanding the role of NEDs of SMEs in
implementing the NRCCG by the AIM listed
companies in the UK.
The paper proceeds as follows. Introduction to the
study is followed by a brief review of literature on the
role of NEDs and role theories. Research methodology
with the adoption of content analysis is presented in
detail in the second section of the paper. The
presentation of results and discussion of finding is
presented next. Finally, we conclude the paper with our
contribution to the knowledge on the role of NEDs of
SMEs listed in AIM in London stock exchange with a
direction for further research.
2

Within the unitary board system in the UK,
executive directors as well as the NEDs take joint
decisions and bind them all for the decisions taken
(Davies, 2003; Conyon and Muldoon, 2006). A unitary
board system or any other board system such as the
two-tier system of boards exists in countries such as
Germany and Japan (Vives, 2000), members in the
board could have many differences in terms of the age,
qualifications, experience and so on. A number of
authors note the importance of a mixed bag of cognitive
tasks such as right perception, positive beliefs,
assumptions and attributions necessary to create a
successful board (Walsh and Seward, 1990; Forbes and
Milliken, 1999; Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003;
Haleblian and Rajagopalan, 2006).
According to Stiles and Taylor (2001), NEDs are
required to execute three roles: monitoring the
managers, setting the strategic frame, and the service.
However, they argue that 'the strategic role is said to be
the defining role of the board and given the term
'director' means playing an important part in
determining organization's effectiveness' (Styles and
Taylor, 2001, p.27). Because ofthe significanct nature
of these roles, a board is explained as the apex of the
firm's decision control system by Fama and Jensen
(1983a). Many authors also agree on the fact that the
NEDs perform a vital function in securing vital
resources for the SMEs such as the markets,
technology, financial institutions and so on (Neilsen and
Rao, 1987; Burt, 1997). In general, Mintzberg (1983)
identified seven roles of the NEDs: (1) selecting the
CEO; (2) exercising direct control during periods of
criSis; (3) reviewing managerial decisions and
performance; (4) co-opting external influencers; (5)
establishing contacts and raising funds; (6) enhancing
the organisation's reputation and (7) giving advice to
the organisation.
In addition, Roberts, McNulty and Stiles (2005)
emphasise the need to create accountability within the
board by the NEDs in making an effective dialogue at
the board meetings. Accordingly, NEDs could be
effective if only they pay their attention at the board
meetings in challenging and questioning appropriately
about the assumptions of the managers while supporting
them. They caution that the NEDs must understand

Literaure review

The role of the directors of public limited liability
companies in the UK is explained broadly in sections
171 to 177 in the Companies Act of 2006 as (i) to serve
the company within the powers, (ii) promotion of the
business and (iii) exercise judgment and exercise
reasonable care. The Corporate Governance Code
(FRC, 2012) in the UK explains the role of the NEDs as
follows:
'Non-executive directors should scrutinise the
performance of management in meeting agreed
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about their non-executive function and must have an
incremental approach with a mindset of an 'experienced
ignorance' which they term as ' ... just by asking the
idiot-boy questions' (Roberts, McNulty and Stiles,
2005, p.14). Useem (2003) also note that corporate
failure could be avoided with probing and challenging
the assumptions of the managers. A synthesis of several
arguments cited above has been brought under a
concept of "corporate directing" by Pye (2002), which
covers governing, strategizing and leading. Corporate
directing includes, 'more than just board behaviour, but
all aspects of directors' communications, both explicit
and implicit as well as inside and outside their
organisation in the process of shaping their
organisation's future' (Pye,2002, P.155).

3 Theories on roles
According to the above analysis, the role of the board is
complex and it has to deal with a multitude of tasks
other than the monitoring and controlling proposed by
the agency theorists (Jensen and Meckling, 1976;
Eisenhardt, 1989). As such, the approach of this paper
is to use the Role Theory (Sarbin and Allen, 1968) as
the guiding framework to analyse the role of NEDs. In
role theory, a role is never defined by itself. It is
defined in relation to other possible tasks - mother and
father in relation to daughter and son, merchant in
relation to customer and artisan, etc., 'which can be
designated as counter positions. . . . a role frame'
(Connell, 1979, p.11 ). These counter positions or 'role
senders' (Rogers and Molnar, 1976:598) represent a
number of parties. Shareholders (Koehn and Ueng,
2005; Jong, Mertens and Roosenboom, 2006),
employees (Clapham and Cooper, 2005), and debtors
(Day and Taylor, 1998) are the major role senders or
the stakeholders. These stakeholders have the decision
making power to offer rewards if their expectations are
met, otherwise the use of punishments such as the
removal of the directors from the positions may occur
(Connell, 1979).
According to these theoretical arguments, if the
expectations of the stakeholders could be identified, it
could be possible to list out the tasks to be performed
by the NEDs, disregarding the fact that job contract of
NEDs could be incomplete due to many other factors
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Due to the large number and a wide
variety of stakeholders (Stenberg, 1997) and the
difficulty of understanding the relative importance of
each stakeholder (Friedman and Miles, 2002), writing
the job contract for the NEDs is challenging and a
difficult task.
While the Principal-Agent Theory
(Jensen and Meckling, (1976) explains that
shareholders expect the principals to maximise their
interests mainly the return on capital, Huse (2005)
argues that there are altruists also among the

shareholders who do not necessarily expect
maximisation of return for their investments. Huse
(2005) argues that investors expect their investments to
generate some social benefits too such as environmental
protection, social equity and so on. Given these
theoretical positions and arguments, what is identifiable
is the difficulty of getting a clear idea about the desired
roles of NEDs, which provides the theoretical basis for
adopting the content analysis of annual reports of
companies listed in the AIM.

4 Methodology
We adopted content analysis as a method of data
collection form companied listed in the AIM. It is based
on the analysis of annual reports of companies to be
selected. Corporate annual reports are widely used in
content analysis in accounting research such as
disclosures and social reporting (e.g., Milne and Adler,
1999; Smith and Taffler, 2000; Beattie, Mcinnes and
Fearnley, 2004; Alsaeed, 2006). Research evidence also
indicates that a number of other disciplines such as
communication through internet web sites (Perry and
Bodkin, 2000; Jun and Cai, 2001); management
research (Jauch, Osborn and Martin, 1980), marketing
(Harris and Attour, 2000), Business Ethics (Bell and
Bryman, 2007) and Political Science (Hart, Jarvis and
Lim, 2002) have also benefitted from the content
analysis research method. Alsaeed's (2006) analysis of
the relationship between the disclosure level and the
appointment of the NEDs was also based on the content
analysis. To the best of our knowledge on roles of
NEDs, no studies can be found with the adoption of
content analysis method using annual reports of
companies.

4,1 Unit of analysis
Milne and Adler (1999) point out that a sentence of a
text is reliable than a word and page in a document for
content analysis. However, the decision on the selection
of the unit of analysis has to be taken in the context of
the research and the type of the document (Weber,
1990; Neuendorf, 2002; Krippendorff, 2004). Stiles
(2001, p.634) notes that 'sentences that contain
reference to board's involvement in strategy was
analysed and key verbs or qualifiers were highlighted to
ascertain the mode of involvement'. For the proposed
study, we also selected the sentence as the unit of
analysis.

4.2 Stability, reliability and validity
Kassarjian (1977, p.8) notes that content analysis is a
research technique for the 'objective, systematic and
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quantitative description of the manifest content of
communication' and that three properties should be
achieved by a content analyst, namely; stability,
reliability and validity.
According to Kassarj ian (1977), the stability can
be achieved if the coding of a document is done in the
same way after a period of two weeks, and if the same
codes are given for the document coded. Reliability is
the degree of confidence a reader could develop in his
or her mind about the results of the content analysis. In
order to ensure reliability, there are many steps to
follow in the content analysis.
Several steps are taken to ensure reliability: (1)
preparation of the coding instrument; for the coding of
annual reports; (2) theoretical framework to develop the
coding instrument, (3) establishment of coding decision
rules. These steps could ensure the protection of two
properties in content analysis (Weber, 1990; Neuendorf,
2002; Krippendorff, 2004), i.e. mutual exclusiveness
and mutual exhaustiveness. Mutual exclusiveness
means that a sentence could fall only into a single
category and mutual exhaustiveness means that all the
sentences in the selected 'locations' (Milne and Adler,
1999) in an annual report are paid the attention of the
coder (Weber, 1990; Neuendorf, 2002; Krippendorff,
2004). Denscombe (2003) points out that constant
comparison by going backward and upward in the
document could ensure the above two properties.
Validity means the categories established in the
content analysis have the property of explaining the
particular phenomena that is meant for the analysis.
Validity consists of two components namely internal
validity and external validity. If the categories
established through the coding process are backed by
the theory, internal validity is ensured. For example,
category of strategy, advice and monitoring and so on
are found as tasks of the NEDs (Stiles and Taylor,
2001). Any conceptual term not familiar with the
researcher is required to be considered as unique at the
open coding stage (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). However,
in order to ensure complete understanding of such
conceptual terms or what Glaser and Strauss (1967)
explain as theoretical saturation or theoretical
sensitivity (Ahuvia, 200 I). Such conceptual terms
found in the open coding stage is further studied to see
whether there is any theory behind (Perry and Bodkin,
2000).

the emerging pattern of the data and the picture. When
there are two or more coders, it is essential to see the
inter-coder agreement (Milne and Adler, 1999).
However, when there is only one coder as found in this
research, Ahuvia (200 I) and Milne and Adler (1999)
explain that the researcher should have the theoretical
knowledge to gain theoretical saturation and the
development of the coding instrument, which could be
considered to show the theoretical knowledge and
sensitivity in the subject. Location of sentences in the
annual reports and coding rules applicable to current
study are presented below.

4·4 Location of the sentences:
Berg (2004) emphasises the need to look across the
document to identify the themes needed for the
analysis. 'Themes may be located in a variety of places
in most written documents, it becomes necessary to
specify in advance which places will be searched'
(Berg, 2004, p.273). Thus the page or the section of the
document or 'location in report' (Milne and Adler,
1999) is identified before the proper coding takes place.
We examined a number of sections as highlighted
below from 75 annual reports to prepare the coding
instrument and to select the location of the themes of
the coding instrument in the annual reports. The
selected sections include Chair's statement, CEOs
statement/review, Corporate governance report,
Directors' details, and Directors' report.

4·5 Coding decision rules
Milne and Adler (1999) and Beattie, Mcinnes and
Feamley (2004) point out the need for developing
coding rules in order to make the coding instrument and
coding process reliable and valid. Following decision
rules are developed for the coding process of the annual
reports of the AIM companies:
(1) The objective is to identify the role ofNEDs.
(2) Selection of annual reports
Annual reports of AIM companies are chosen
irrespective of the sector. Number of annual reports or
the sections selected is not a priori decision. It will
depend on the theoretical saturation or sensitivity
explained earlier.
(3) Coding process - basic rules, specific rules and
exclusion rules

4·3 Coding of annual reports
Basic rules of coding are as follows:
For the coding of the annual reports for content
analysis, a sample of AIM annual reports is selected.
The number of annual reports selected is not a priori
decision. As Glasser and Strauss (1967) and Ahuvia
(200 I) explain, last annual report to be coded would be
decided when only the coder gets an understanding of

(a) Unit of analysis is the sentence. A conceptual
term should reside in the sentence selected
otherwise the sentence is excluded protecting the
two properties explained earlier (mutual
exclusiveness and mutual exhaustiveness).
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(b) Following locations in an annual report are
coded: (a) Chairman's statement (b) Chief
Executive Officer's report (c) Corporate
Governance report; (d) Directors' details or
biographies report and (e) Directors' report.
(c) The paragraph number and the location of the
sentence is entered in the database in order to
enable constant comparison (Denscombe, 2003),
that is going backward and forward in the
document to ensure mutual exclusiveness and
exhaustiveness explained earlier.

frequencies are to the expected frequencies. We find
that it appropriate to use this test because the coding of
the annual reports generates only categorical data.
Number of pre-requisites are required in order to
calculate the

2

(Cooper and Schindler, 2003): (1)

content analysis data should be from a sample of a
population which is assumed to be randomly
distributed; (2) categorical data must be mutually
exclusive and exhaustive; (3) data must be reported in
frequencies not in percentages; (4) there should not be
any cells with zero frequency and (5) expected
frequencies below five should not compose more than
twenty per cent of the cells.
Muhr (1991, p. 358) argues that the insignificant
frequencies could either be deleted, amalgamated or
redefined. 'Codes and memos that have already been
delineated can be renamed, deleted, uncoupled from
codes or redefined by simply re-selecting them'.
However, uncoupling or collapsing of the categories
should avoid any loss of the significance of the data.
The removal of the less frequent categories ensures the

Specific rules: Following questions are asked before the
coding process begins.
(a) Does the sentence mention the words Non
Executive Directors (NEDs)?
(b) Does it have an identifiable outcome and who
claim it? NED or board?
(c) If the word NED does not appear, does the word
'Board' or the phrase 'Board of Directors'
appear?
(d) If the above criteria fulfils, does the board has
NEDs?

application of the X

2

but could damage the picture to

emerge. However, Cooper and Schindler (2003) point
out that if there is a significant difference between the
observed and expected values, it is required to identify
those cells and reasons behind the differences.

Exclusion rules on coding are as follows:
(a) Sentences which start with the words 'We' and
'Our' are excluded. Top management which
include NEDs take decisions jointly (Hambrick
and Mason, 1984). The context (Johns, 2001) of
the sentence is evaluated.
(b) Within the annual reports, corporate governance
report and the directors' report, the statutory
responsibilities of the directors as per the
Companies Act (2006) have been indicated. If a
sentence says anything other than these statutory
responsibilities such as the maintenance of the
web site, it will be considered as a contribution
of the NEDs.
As such, the sentence is
considered for coding.

4·7 Content analysis schedule
In order to understand the nature of implementation of
the provisions of the FRC (2006), that is separation of
chair and the CEO role, appointment of subcommittees of the board and appointment of NEDs,
annual reports that are coded are used to get answers for
the following questions: (1) How many directors are in
the company? (2) How many of them are NEDs? (3)
What is the title of the Chair? (4) How many sub
committees of the board operate? These questions could
be included in a content analysis schedule (Jauch,
Osborn and Martin ( 1980, pp.524-525). Many authors
use annual reports to find out the extent of
implementation of the codes on corporate governance in
listed companies but do not strictly follow the content
analysis rules (Dahya, McConnell and Travlos, 2002;
Pass, 2004). With the insights gained through the above
methodological approaches, the next section presents
the results of our analysis.

4.6 Bases of interpretation of coded data:
Contingency tables (Rose and Sullivan, 1998) or
frequency analysis is the popular method of data
tabulation interpretation of content analysts (Farrell and
Cobbin, 1996; Perry and Bodkin, 2000, Jun and Cai,
2001, Harris and Attour, 2003; Beattie, Mcinnes and
Feamley 2004). This paper also follows the
methodological insights of the above papers namely, the
preparation of cross tabulated data tables and frequency
analysis.
2

x

5 Analysis and results
Our analysis is based on information presented in 75
annual reports. Since the coding of the number of
annual reports were decided when the researchers
gained an understanding of the emerging pattern of the
role of NEDs, the number of annual reports used to get

..

This research paper uses X test " (Cooper and
Schindler, 2003) to see how close the observed
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single NED in 8 per cent of companies (Table 2). The
degree of significance given for the sub-committees
varies among the firms. This could be due to the firm
specific factors such as the stage of growth of the
company, appraisal of cost and benefit of subcommittees, growth of the market and so on.
The significance of existence of sub-committees in
corporate governance could be a reflection of vigilant
corporate governance at the expense of the vital
strategic role of the NEDs (e.g. Taylor, 2004 ).
However, sub-committees could be an avenue for more
discussions and sharing ideas among board members
and also for polarisation of ideas and diversities if they
are not matched properly (Sundaramurthy and Lewis,
2003). Pettigrew and McNulty (1995) find that there are
two types of board cultures namely maximalist and
minimalist. Maximalist culture accommodates more
discussions, listening, collaborative work and the
minimalist boards are in the opposite side of these
attributes.
The evidence shows that there could be more
vigilant corporate governance in AIM companies which
are dominated by the NED chairs. For example, in
Table 4, of the 1,220 sentences coded, 703 sentences
(58.0 per cent of total sentences) are in the coded
annual reports where there are NED chairs. There are
245 sentences coded (20.1 per cent) in the annual
reports reflecting executive chairs. In the unclassified
chairman category, there are 272 sentences coded (23.9
per cent). Thus, the number of sentences in the annual
reports coded with the presence ofNED chairs could be
used as a proxy for more vigilance corporate
governance.
This picture is further supported by the
information presented in Table 5. Table 5 shows that
when the number of NEDs in a board is two 34.8 per
cent (with 425 sentences) and
30.1 per cent (with 367 sentences) of the coded
sentences are found respectively. A remarkable feature
is that when there are more than 4 NEDs in a board, the
number of coded sentences remains low. A number of
previous researchers point out that when there are more
than the required number of NEDs, board deliberations
are difficult and virtually collapse the board level of
discussions (Walsh and Seward, 1990; Sundaramurthy
and Lewis, 2003). However, this possibility has to be
verified with empirical research as the required number
may vary according to the complexity of other aspects
of firms.

the understanding of the corporate governance
mechanisms of the AIM companies were limited to the
same number of annual reports (75). Although this may
not be a representative sample of the total number of
AIM companies (about 1076 as at December 2012), the
following data still reflect an important picture with
regard to the degree of voluntary acceptance of the
principles and provisions of Code on Corporate
Governance. Appointment of the NEDs as chairs,
number ofNEDs and acceptance of the sub committees
of the board are some examples we have found in this
study.

5.1 Corporate Governance variables: type of
chair, number ofNEDs and sub committees
Table I shows that the AIM companies use three
different titles beneath the statement of the chairman in
the annual reports coded: Executive chair (22. 7 per
cent) non-executive chair (52 per cent) and chairman
(25.3 per cent). The annual reports which do not specifY
beneath the statement of chair whether the chair is an
executive or non-executive director belong to the
category of chairman. However, a closer look at the
bibliography page ofthe board members and in relation
to the chair, it is found that the chair is classified either
as executive chair or non-executive chair. However,
whether the NED chair meets the criteria of
independence (Higgs, 2003) could be judged by seeing
whether the particular NED chair has shares and any
other interests in the company. Our finding shows that
majority of the NED chairs of AIM companies have
shares in the companies they work and not truly
independent as the NED chairs of FTSE I00
companies.
Table 2 shows that vast majority of companies (92
per cent) appoint NEDs. There are no NEDs at present
in six companies (8 per cent). Thirty two percent of
companies (24) have two NEDs. There are twenty two
firms (29 per cent) with three NEDs. While there is
only one company with five NEDs, eleven companies
have four NEDs each. This picture shows a remarkable
acceptance of the significant role present and role of
NEDs.
Table 3 shows that the audit and remuneration
committees are more established units for about 74 per
cent of companies. It also shows that the nomination
committees (41 per cent) are still to develop as a whole.
However, there is no clear term of reference for the sub
committees in the AIM listed firms as applicable for the
FTSE 100 companies. Interestingly, it is found that 35
per cent of companies have all three sub-committees.
There are at least two committees in about 33 percent of
companies. More importantly, almost one fourth of
companies have no a single sub-committee in the board.
This is also compatible with the non-availability of a
~

_~ ~

5.2 Characteristics of the roles ofNEDs
Content analysis data shows at least four major
characteristics of the roles ofthe NEDs.
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roles. When we apply the same rule for the executive
chair, we could identify meetings (12.7 per cent),
organisation (11.2 per cent), responsibilities (10.7 per
cent), revisions (8.3 per cent) and approvals (6.3 per
cent) as important roles among other categories. Within
the unclassified chair, responsibilities (10.8 per cent),
revisions (10.3 per cent), meetings (9.9 per cent),
organisation (9.4 per cent), approvals (8.1 per cent) and
monitoring (7.6 per cent) take higher values according
to the above 5 per cent rule. Across all the chairs,
several categories such as organising the tasks of the
board, meetings, responsibilities, revisions and
approvals are more important than other roles.

5.2.1 Characteristic 1: Multiplicity of roles
Multiplicity of the tasks is the major feature found in
relation to the roles of the NEDs, which is reflected by
existence of a relatively large number of tasks. Table 4
shows that the result of the content analysis indicates 37
tasks of the NEDs. Cognitive tasks are explained in
theory but there is lack of empirical evidence in relation
to board research (Forbes and Milliken, 1999, Haleblian
and Rajagopalan, 2006). This survey finds number of
cognitive tasks of the NEDs such as beliefs (2.7 per
cent or just 33 sentences), considerations (2.4 per cent
or 25 sentences) and expectations (1.9 per cent or 23
sentences). Beliefs make a vital function among many
stakeholders in large organisations (Steiner and
Edmunds, 1979). Beliefs created among the minds of
the stakeholders by the board or beliefs of boards are
important to develop the morale of the management and
employees. Gist ( 1987) explains that the beliefs guide
many actions such as recruitment, setting of goals for
the corporation and motivation of employees. Such
beliefs are one of the decisive factors of job satisfaction
(Brief and Aldag, 1981 ). Design and development of
criteria to evaluate the board performance and
recruitment of the directors is vital to protect interests
of the stakeholders as explained by Useem (2003) who
points out the lack of such criteria reflects in the failed
giant corporations in the US. Interestingly, the issue of
whether there is an evaluation of the performance of
both the NEDs and executive directors counts for only
just close to I per cent of sentences (II sentences)
coded. This finding is consistent with Higgs's (2003)
finding that the evaluation is one of the least considered
board tasks. Our analysis also shows the less
significance role of criteria development for managerial
decision making ( l.O per cent). Useem (2003) also
pointed out that criteria development for the managerial
decisions and for the board tasks is one of the most
needed but forgotten task of boards.

5.2.3 Characteristic 3: Variation within roles in Role
Engagement
Variations in relation to ways of engagement in above
roles NEDs are noted under this characteristic. For
example, the task in relation to strategy has many
variations of engagement such as planning, approval,
revision and so on. Stiles (2001) also found such variety
of tasks in relation to strategy. In particular, he
identified that revision, approvals, monitoring as sub
parts of the process of strategy. The result of our
analysis presented in Table 5 also indicates a member
of such roles such as monitoring, revisions, and
approval .

5.2.4 Characteristic 4:
Keeper role

Identification of the Gate

This survey supports the Gate Keeper role of the NEDs
(e.g. Kirkbride and Letza, 2005). Accordingly,
preparation of the terms of reference of the NEDs and
appointment of the sub committees of the board such as
the audit, remuneration and nomination committee
could be considered as strengthening the Gate Keeper
role of the NEDs. Some excerpts from the annual
reports coded to support these roles are: 'The directors
intend to strengthen the Board through the appointment
of at least one new non-executive director' (LP A
Group, Annual Report, 2006, p,4). 'The directors have
established audit Nomination and remuneration
committees with formally delegated rules and
responsibilities. Each of the committees currently
comprises the non-executive directors' (Celoxica
Annual Report: 2006, p.15).

5.2.2 Characteristic 2: Differences in roles according
to the type of chair
In order to understand the relative significance of each
category of roles according to the type of chair, we
decided an arbitrary value to judge the most significant
role categories for a chair (as 5 per cent of coded
sentences or above). Accordingly, Table 5 shows that
some role categories are more significant for some type
of chairmen. For example, the NED chair considers
organisation (11.5 per cent), responsibilities (9.3 per
cent), revisions (9.1 per cent), meetings (8.8 per cent),
approvals (7.3 per cent), studying information (6.6 per
cent), recommendations (6.3
per cent) and
considerations (5.6 per cent) as relatively significant

5·3 Validity and reliability of content
analysis
The aim of the Chi Square statistical test was to see
whether the coded data is randomly distributed ensuring
mutual exclusiveness and exhaustiveness of the
categories. As explained earlier, categories which have
5 or less than 5 frequencies are removed to calculate the
~

.

1_ NnJ< NI/':SS'
l!!.!ii!!if ---~

226

Corporate Ownersliip

r:::l Contro{/'Vo{ume 13, Issue 1, }lutumn 2015, Continue£- 2

expectancy values (Cooper and Schindler, 2003).
Accordingly, the total number of sentences remained
883 from the initial number of 1,220 sentences (Table
6). Table 6 shows the calculated expected values. The
difference between the observed and the expected
values (residual values) is only a matter for further
analysis when there is a significant difference between
the two.
Accordingly, the calculated Chi Square value is
16.85 with the degree of freedom of 26. The table value
for degree of freedom of 26 with the 0.05 confidence
level is 38.85. As the calculated value is less than the
table value, null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The
independence between the variables is indicated. On the
other hand, it means that each category has its' own
independent distribution with the protection of the
properties in content analysis, that is mutual
exclusiveness and exhaustiveness. This signifies that
the content analysis data is randomly distributed. A
discussion on the relationship between these variable is
presented below under discussion.

6.2
More
emphasis
on
corporate
governance than the strategic direction
The content analysis gives the opportunity to
understand vital aspects of corporate governance
emerging in the context of the enhanced emphasis of
the role of NEDs (Gnan et al., 2013; Al-Najjar, 2014;
FRC, 2006). The finding of the existence ofNED chair
and the sub committees of boards could be considered
as more attentive compliance for corporate governance.
This is rather consistent with Pettigrew and McNulty's
( 1995) finding that boards which give equal chance for
the directors to discuss or make their points heard by
the others, have more independent directors. They
further emphasized that such boards involve in more
corporate governance roles than the boards with more
executive directors.
However, paying more attention on corporate
governance could lead to less attention on the
entrepreneurial activities of the companies. Strategic
contribution and entrepreneurial role are pointed out as
key aspects of NEDs' roles (FRC, 2006). Chambers
(2005) argues that 'many directors will concur with the
sentiment that a greater proportion of their available
time is now taken up with accountability, audit, risk
management and control matters than was historically
the case' (p:28). The roles we found in our content
analysis also indicate that organisation, meetings, and
responsibilities take a higher value than the areas
covered under the theme 'strategy'. Therefore,
corporate governance roles tend to overrides strategic
direction of the firms represented in this study.
Therefore, the survey could build a 'Rough hypothesis'
(Berg, 2004, p. :283) that greater the tendency towards
NEDs playing more important roles in boards, higher
the possibility ofNEDs' involvement in more corporate
governance role than strategic roles.

6 Discussion
We found that NEDs play not only just number of roles,
but also engage in various tasks and cognitive roles as
well. When considering all these as a whole, they
represent such characteristics as multiplicity of roles,
role differentiation by the type of chair, variation within
roles in role engagement, and the existence of the gatekeeper role. In the theoretical section of this study, we
emphasized the value of role theory. As such, we
discuss our findings in relation to the assertion of role
senders or stakeholders' expectations in identifYing and
discussing roles of NEDs. In addition, the result of
content analysis has provided us with the opportunity to
evaluate the weight of corporate governance roles and
strategic roles and making a 'rough hypotheses' (Berg,
2004:283) about the relative importance of the roles of
NEDs of surveyed companies.

Identification
and
meeting
expectations ofseveral stakeholders

6.1

6.3 Identification of independent and
dependent relationship between roles

of
Using the Chi Square test we performed, we could also
develop a 'rough hypothesis' (Berg, 2004:283) that
there is a relationship between the cognitive aspects of
the NEDs and the extent of involvement in such roles as
strategic, advisory, monitoring, criteria development,
evaluation, and leadership. Logical concepts could be
related to each other in the context of discussion
(Toulmin, Rieke and Janik, 1979). Thus, the Figure 1
shows the mapping of the relationship between
cognitive tasks and the more manifest variables such as
strategy, advice and monitoring in the context of the
tasks of the NEDs found in this survey. Straight lines
show the direct relationship between the cognitive
tasks. Dashed lines show that the cognitive tasks

Within the multiple numbers of tasks, it is possible to
identify that NEDs play a variety of roles to meet the
expectations of several role senders such as the
shareholders, CEO and regulatory authorities. Some of
these tasks could meet the expectations of several role
senders simultaneously. For example, the tasks of
meetings (9.8 per cent), communication (3.l per cent),
beliefs (4.3 per cent) and expectations (3.5 per cent)
could meet the needs of shareholders, CEO and
'regulatory authorities' (Jones and Pollit, 2003), such as
Financial Services Authority (FSA, 2006) and Financial
Reporting Council (FRC, 2006).
~
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themselves are moderated by the manifest tasks or the
results brought by the particular action in relation to
strategy, monitoring and advice. Therefore, there is

action and reaction relationship between cognitive tasks
and key roles ofNEDs.

Figure l. Testable relationships between cognitive Tasks and Key NED roles

Strategy

Beliefs

Expectations

Advice

Considerations

Monitoring

Key: relationship
+------- -Indirect
direct
This drawing is a result of logical
reasoning (Reynolds, 1971; Toulmin,
Rieke and Janik, 1979) and mental
mapping
(Farrand,
Hussain and
Hennessy, 2002), based on the results of
content analysis.

opportunity to use quantitative, qualitative and
descriptive information for exploring the realities of
NEDs roles in SMEs. For example, when NEDs play
their roles in a situation where the implementation of
NRCCG is not compulsory, cognitive functions such as
positive attitudes, appropriate beliefs and considerations
are found to be important as they are associated NEDs
key roles such as advice, strategy, and monitoring. Such
explanation cannot be made by relying only on
quantitative and summarised information presented
Table 6. As such, the possibility of looking at the issue
from different perspective is another advantage of the
content analysis approach adopted in this study.
Accordingly, we found that tasks can be identified as
dimensions of roles. This view of NEDs role is
consistent with previous research findings as well. For
example, a number of previous studies have indicated
and have indicated that tasks can be identified not only
as just roles but also as specific roles (Gnan et al., 2013;
Sciascia et al., 2013; Heuvel, Oils and Voordeckers,
2006). Another key finding of this study is that the role
of NEDs is conditioned by NEDs own cognitive tasks
such as beliefs, assumptions and expectations of NEDs
and by the expectations of the stakeholders. One of the
implications of this finding is that NEDs and CEOs of

7 Conclusion and recommendations
We aimed at exploring the roles of NEDs in
implementing NRCCG in SMEs and examining their
characteristics and relationships by adopting content
analysis of annual reports. The findings revealed that
NEDs perform a multiple number of roles, tasks and
cognitive functions to meet the expectation of several
stakeholders simultaneously, such as the CEO,
regulatory authorities, and shareholders. This reflects
the fact that NEDs are a special kind of bees in the bee
hive of board. Therefore, for proper understanding of
roles of NEDs in SMEs, researchers may consider all
these roles, tasks, and functions as an integrative system
(e.g. Gnan et al., 2013). As such, the realities ofNEDs
role of SMEs cannot be understood by relying only on
quantitative analysis and summarised roles. The content
analysis methodology we adopted provided us with the
,
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SMEs can use these insights in the formation of
expectation on job descriptions and person
specifications relevant to recruitment, training &
development, and performance management purposes.
This study also provides ample insights into the
adoption of content analysis on exploring roles of
boards and actions in corporate boards by using
information recorded in annual reports. Further research
is required to understand the distinctive processes
involved in each tasks identified. For examples, roles
such as recommendation, decision making, approval
etc. have their own processes despite the fact that they
contain closely related meaning. Such process studies
are yet to come into the reality of board work (Gnan et
Further, based on
al., 20 13; Pettigrew, 1997).
quantitative, qualitative and descriptive information
presented in this study, we could also develop a model
depicting conceptual and testable relationships between
cognitive tasks and key roles of NEDs for future
studies. As indicated in a number of previous
researches, this study reflects the difficulty of
developing a general theory on the role of NEDs to
satisfY the expectations of stakeholders such as the
CEO, shareholders, and regulatory authorities due to a
number of limitations. First, researchers have largely
focused on the role of NEDs in AIM companies.
Therefore, the results could be more of relevance to the
AIM companies. Second, selection of a set of annual
reports for the content analysis was done on a random
basis from the annual reports collected from the Annual
Report Service in the UK. Third, declarations of annual
reports are assumed to be true despite the fact that there
are arguments on the accuracy of information (Atkinson
2
and offey, 2004, Abeysckera, 2006). However, X test
analysis of this study proved the randomisation of the
categories in the content analysis. Therefore, it is an
assurance of the reliability of the content analysis.
Fourth, when there are semantic differences,
understanding the meaning of a particular term could
become difficult. This might be addressed in future
studies by selecting methodologies that support looking
at issues from different perspectives.
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Appendices
Table 1. Type of chair
Type of Chairman

Number of firms

Per cent

Chairman

19

25.3

Executive Chair

17

22.7

Non-Executive Chair

39

52.0

Total

75

100.0

Source: Content analysis data
Table 2. Number ofNEDs
Number ofNEDs

Number of firms

Per cent

0

6
11
24
22

8.0
14.7
32.0
29.3
14.7

1
2
3
4
5
Total

11
I
75

l.3

100.0

Source: Content AnalysiS data
Table 3: Sub committees of the board
Committee

Number of firms

Per cent (out of 75)

Audit

56

74.7

Remuneration

55

73 .3

Nomination

31

41.3

All three of above committees

26

34.7

Two committees

25

33.3

Only one committee

5

6.6

No sub committees

19

25.3

Source: Content analys1s data
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Table 6. Calculated expected values for Chi Square test
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Table 7: Chi-Square tests
Chi-Square Tests
Value

Df

Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)

Pearson Chi-Square

112.299a

72

0.002

Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear
Association

117.293

72

0.001

0.835

1

0.361

N of Valid Cases

1220

a 51 cells (45.9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .20.
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